



# First Annual Tax Conference on Hedge Fund Structuring and Compensation

**May 28, 2008**

Moderator - Matthew Stevens

Panelists - Jim Croker ▪ Andy Immerman

Tim Selby ▪ Carolyn Smith

Laura Thatcher ▪ Chuck Wheeler




# Overview

- Basic Hedge Fund Structuring
- Compensating Managers and Advisors
- Allocating Gains and Losses for U.S. Tax Purposes
- Structuring Investments into Hedge Funds
- Avoiding problems under ERISA




# Basic Hedge Fund Structuring

# Basic Hedge Fund Structuring: Overview




- Typical structure for a US-managed hedge fund
- As explained below, the fund structure is driven by tax positions of fund sponsors and investors
- Some funds may be single entity funds or use mini-master or parallel fund structure

# Basic Hedge Fund Structuring: Master Fund




- Classified as a partnership for US tax purposes
- If non-US entity, likely to need to file check-the-box election
  - Typically organized as an offshore limited liability company or corporation that would be classified as a corporation for US tax purposes absent an election

# Basic Hedge Fund Structuring: Master Fund (cont.)




- Partnership classification avoids PFIC status for non-US master fund
- Partnership classification allows character pass-through (e.g., long-term capital gains).
  - Frequent trading may limit long-term capital gains.
  - 1256 contracts – 60% long-term capital gain; 40% short-term capital gains

# Basic Hedge Fund Structuring: Master Fund (cont.)




- May be US or non-US entity
  - Non-US master fund most common
  - US entity may simplify US withholding tax issues
  - If non-US entity, foreign withholding partnership rules may avoid over-withholding
  - Non-US entity reduces possibility that investee corporation treated as CFC

# Basic Hedge Fund Structuring: Offshore Feeder




- Investment vehicle for US tax-exempt investors and non-US investors
  - Classified as corporation for US tax purposes.
  - Blocks UBTI for US tax-exempt investors
  - Blocks ECI for non-US investors
  - May incur US withholding taxes and US tax liability and branch profits tax on ECI

# Basic Hedge Fund Structuring: Offshore Feeder (cont.)




- UBTI blocker
  - Trade or business income
  - Debt-financed income
- ECI blocker
  - Trade or business income.
  - FIRPTA gains
  - Section 864 safe harbors for trading stocks, securities, commodities, and derivatives

# Basic Hedge Fund Structuring: Offshore Feeder (cont.)




- Offshore feeder would be a PFIC and, accordingly, is generally considered unattractive to US taxable investors
- If US investor has access to sufficient information to make QEF election, may benefit from avoiding investment expense limitations

# Basic Hedge Fund Structuring: Onshore Feeder




- Investment vehicle for US taxable investors
  - Avoid entity-level tax
  - Character flow-through
- Sometimes also used by state pension plans not subject to tax on UBTI
- Limited partnerships historically chosen rather than LLCs.

# Basic Hedge Fund Structuring: Onshore Feeder (cont.)




- Investors in Onshore Feeder and Offshore Feeder have periodic redemption rights
- Redemption rights create risk that Onshore Feeder could be publicly traded partnership taxed as a corporation
  - Exception if no more than 100 partners
  - Exception if 90% of gross income every year is passive income
  - Exception for certain limited redemption plans

# Basic Hedge Fund Structuring: Both Feeders



- May issue different classes of interests
  - Tracking incentive allocations for shares issued between incentive fee calculation dates
  - Different redemption rights.
  - Different management fees and/or incentive fees
  - Classes that participate or do not participate in new issues
  - Different currency denominations

# Hedge Fund Structuring Issues: Investment Advisor & General Partnership




- Typically structured as US LLCs
- Sometimes separate investment advisor and GP:
  - Facilitates different ownership
  - Avoids NYC UBT on incentive allocation to GP if Investment Advisor has an office in NYC




# Hedge Fund Compensation Issues

# Overview of Hedge Fund Manager Compensation




- Management fees paid by Offshore Feeder and Onshore Feeder – generally 1-2% of NAV
  - Deferrable under 409A.
- Incentive compensation (“carried interest”) – generally 20% of increase in NAV over high-water mark
  - Profits allocation from Onshore Feeder to GP (partnership profits interest)
  - Deferrable fee from Offshore Feeder to Investment Advisor
  - Alternatively, allocation or fee from Master Fund, based on calculations at Feeder Funds level
  - Calculated quarterly, semi-annually, or annually-accelerated with respect to redeeming investors




**Hedge Fund  
Compensation Issues:  
Profits Interest in a  
Partnership**

# Hedge Fund Compensation Issues: Profits Interest in Partnership



- Investment Advisor, GP, and Onshore Feeder classified as partnerships for US tax purposes
- Incentive allocation from Onshore Feeder and interests in Investment Advisor and GP structured as profits interests


# Hedge Fund Compensation Issues: Profits Interest in Partnership (cont.)



## Benefits of Using Profits Interests

- Tax-free receipt of profits interests
- Character flow-through
- Capital gain on sale of interest
- Deferral until gain recognized by Master Fund
  - Less significant for hedge funds with frequent trading or mark-to-market for tax purposes, e.g., section 1256 contracts
- No self-employment taxes on distributions
- Section 409A inapplicable
- May avoid investment expense limitations for investors

# Profits Interest in Partnership: Current Tax Rules



- Capital interest v. profits interest:
  - Capital interest = some liquidation value
  - Profits interest = anything other than capital interest (including “carried interest”)
- Receiving a partnership interest for services:
  - Capital interest for services is taxable
  - Currently: IRS generally won’t attempt to tax the receipt of a profits interest for services Rev. Proc. 93-27
  - Currently: Generally no need for section 83(b) election on unvested profits interest for services



# Profits Interest in Partnership: Proposed Changes to Current IRS Rules

- Proposed regulations issued in May 2005 would apply section 83 to receipt of a profits interest for services
- However, the proposed rules generally would allow tax-free receipt of a profits interest, if the right elections are made:
  - “Safe harbor” liquidation value election.
  - Section 83(b) election (for unvested interests)



## Profits Interest in Partnership: Proposed Changes to Current IRS Rules (cont.)

- “Safe Harbor” liquidation election:
  - Value of partnership interest equals “liquidation value”
  - Pure profits interest has no liquidation value
  - Requirements for making an effective election:
    - Partnership agreement must contain provisions, legally binding on all of the partners, that all partners agree to comply with the safe harbor
    - Alternatively, each partner in the partnership must execute a legally binding document agreeing to the safe harbor
    - Forfeiture allocations
  - Effective date of election cannot be prior to execution date



## Profits Interest in Partnership: Proposed Changes to Current IRS Rules (cont.)

- If proper elections not made:
  - Upon grant of vested partnership interest, service partner taxable on the fair market value of the partnership interest
  - Value of partnership interest is the amount a willing buyer would pay a willing seller
  - Even a pure profits interest has some value



## Profits Interest in Partnership: Proposed Legislative Changes (cont.)

- Chairman Rangel's Tax Reform Bill (H.R. 3970) and the "Temporary Tax Relief Act of 2007" (H.R. 3996) as passed by the House
- Would characterize all income allocated to an "investment services partnership interest" as ordinary income from services, regardless of the nature of the income earned by the partnership
- SECA would also apply to such income



## Profits Interest in Partnership: Proposed Legislative Changes (cont.)

- Exception for capital interests, i.e., the portion of a service providers interest that is acquired for invested capital
  - Only a “reasonable allocation” to the service provider’s capital interest is permitted
  - An allocation is not reasonable if the service provider is allocated more than a partner with equivalent invested capital who does not provide services




## Profits Interest in Partnership: Proposed Legislative Changes (cont.)

- Theory of the proposal is that the distributions are payments for personal services and should be taxed as such
- Estimated Revenue Gain (over 10 Years)--\$25 Billion



# Hedge Fund Compensation Issues Fee Income

# Hedge Fund Compensation Issues: Deferral of Fee Income



## Incentive Fee From Offshore Feeder

- Investment Advisor may have right to defer receipt of incentive fees from Offshore Feeder
- Deferral of taxation if:
  - Offshore Feeder uses cash, rather than accrual, method for tax purposes (Investment Advisor may not use cash method if any corporate members)
  - Avoid constructive receipt
- Section 409A requirements are satisfied



# Deferral of Fee Income: Impact of Section 409A

- Significant penalties if section 409A requirements not met
  - Deferral is lost - amounts includible in income when vested
  - Additional 20% tax on ALL deferred amounts (not just those with respect to which a violation occurred);
  - Plus interest on ALL deferred amounts;
  - The service provider liable for the additional tax and interest



## Deferral of Fee Income: Requirements of Section 409A

- Provided section 409A rules are satisfied, the Investment Advisor may choose:
  - How much fee income to defer
  - When the deferred amounts are to be paid.
  - The form of payment of deferred amounts (e.g., installment payments or a lump sum)



## Deferral of Fee Income: Requirements of Section 409A (cont.)

- Strict timing rules on when elections to defer must be made
  - Generally, election must be made in the taxable year before the year in which the services are performed
- Elections to select the time and form of payment must be made at the time of the deferral election



# Deferral of Fee Income: Requirements of Section 409A (cont.)

- Limited opportunities to change the time and form of payment after the initial deferral election
  - Subsequent elections generally cannot be effective until one year after the election is made
  - Acceleration of distributions not permitted
  - New election must defer payment for at least 5 additional years
- Prohibition on offshore funding of deferred compensation



# Deferral of Fee Income: Deferral of Compensation by Employees of Investment Advisor

- Investment Advisor may desire to share management fee with employees; employee deferrals also subject to section 409A rules
- Typical structure
  - Employees elect time and form of payment in accordance with section 409A
  - Payments are made by the fund to Investment Advisor based on employee elections; Investment Advisor then makes payments to employees



# Deferral of Fee Income: Deferral of Compensation by Employees of Investment Advisor (cont.)

- Section 409A has special rules permitting such “back to back” arrangements
  - Unclear under Section 409A whether payments to employees may be made based on events at the Investment Advisor level (“reverse back to back” arrangements)
  - Example: Arrangement provides that all deferred amounts (by Investment Advisor and employees of the Investment Advisor) are paid if the contract between the Investment Advisor and fund terminates



# Deferral of Fee Income: Legislative Proposals

- Headlines contribute to perception by policymakers that fund managers earn substantial amounts that are not adequately taxed
- “1 Man, 1Year \$3.7 Billion Payout” Washington Post, April 17, 2008
- “Wall Street Winners Get Billion Dollar Pay Days” The New York Times, April 16, 2008
- “Managers Use Hedge Funds as Big I.R.A.’s” New York Times, April 17, 2007



# Proposed Current Taxation of Offshore Deferred Compensation

- Most recent version: H.R. 6049, the “Energy and Tax Extenders Act of 2008”
- Compensation received from a “nonqualified entity” is includible in income when vested
  - If the amount of compensation is not readily ascertainable when vested, then income inclusion occurs when the amount is ascertainable, BUT an additional 20% tax and interest applies



## Proposed Current Taxation of Offshore Deferred Compensation (cont.)

- Nonqualified entities:
  - Foreign corporations unless substantially all the income is effectively connected with a US trade or business or subject to a comprehensive foreign income tax
  - A partnership unless substantially all of its income is allocated to persons OTHER than foreign persons whose income is not subject to a comprehensive foreign tax and tax-exempt organizations
- Applies to compensation for services performed after 2008



## Proposed Current Taxation of Offshore Deferred Compensation (cont.)

- With respect to pre-2009 compensation that has already been deferred, applies to amounts otherwise includible in 2018 or later. Such amounts includible income in 2017 or, if later, when vested
- Projected to raise approximately \$25 billion over 10 years



# **\$1 Million Cap on Nonqualified Deferred Compensation**

- Senate proposal from 2007; introduced in April 2008 by Senator Clinton (S. 2866)
- Would impose an annual cap of \$1 million on deferred compensation
- Deferred compensation in excess of the cap would be taxable when vested
- Not targeted at hedge funds; would apply to all nonqualified deferred compensation
- Initial estimate was approximately \$900 million over 10 years



# Allocations of Gains and Losses



# Hedge Fund Allocations: Overview

- Onshore Feeder limited partnership agreement periodically allocates to partners' capital accounts increases in NAV based on beginning capital account balances, with reallocations to General Partner of incentive allocations
- Capital account allocations are not based on tax realization principles



## Hedge Fund Allocations: Overview (cont.)

- Tax items generally to be allocated consistent with capital account allocations – subject to stuffing allocations with respect to redeeming partners
- Separate allocations (and management fees and incentive allocations) for side pocket investments that are illiquid and/or difficult to value



# Stuffing Allocations: The Problem

- Investor X owns 10% of Fund and asks to be redeemed
  - X's capital account (amount to be received on redemption) is \$100
  - X's tax basis in the Fund is \$80
- To redeem X, Fund sells securities worth \$100, and recognizes \$20 gain (taxable). Normally, if Fund has \$20 gain:
  - X is allocated (pays tax on) \$2
  - Remaining investors are allocated (pay tax on) \$18



## Stuffing Allocations: The Problem (cont.)

- Remaining investors complain that X gets all the cash, but they get stuck with 90% of the taxable income
- What to do?



## Stuffing Allocations: A Solution?

- Remaining investors say: allocate all \$20 to X
  - They argue that X comes out the same either way
- If Fund allocates \$2 of gain to X, X has \$20 total gain:
  - \$2 gain allocated from the partnership
  - \$18 additional gain on receiving the \$100 cash in redemption:
    - $\$100 \text{ cash} - (\$80 \text{ prior basis} + \$2 \text{ newly allocated gain}) = \$18$



## Stuffing Allocations: A Solution? (cont.)

- If Fund allocates all \$20 of gain to X, X still has \$20 total gain:
  - \$20 gain allocated from the partnership
  - \$ 0 additional gain on receiving the \$100 cash in redemption:
    - $\$100 \text{ cash} - (\$80 \text{ prior basis} + \$20 \text{ newly allocated gain}) = \$0$



# Stuffing Allocations: A Solution?

- Assume for simplicity all the gain is long-term capital gain
  - So X doesn't care whether he is allocated \$2 or \$20
  - However, the other investors have avoided an allocation of \$18 gain
  - Generally, all gain is not long-term capital gain; redeemed investor may be allocated short-term capital gain, displacing long-term capital gain on redemption payments



## Stuffing Allocations: A Solution? (cont.)

- Allocating that extra \$18 to X is a “stuffing” or “fill-up” allocation
  - It fills X’s tax basis up to the amount of X’s capital account, so X has no additional gain on the redemption distribution



# Stuffing Allocations: A Solution?

- Fill-up allocations seem intuitively fair; the taxable gain is allocated to the investor who gets the cash
- However, fill-up allocations are controversial
  - Allocations generally are supposed to affect the dollar amounts an investor receives; otherwise the allocations lack “economic effect”
  - X receives the same \$100 distribution with or without the fill-up allocation



# Derivative Interests in Hedge Funds



## Derivative Interests in Hedge Funds: Who Might Be Interested?

- Non-U.S. Investors – Conversion of dividend income into foreign source (and therefore exempt) capital gain or swap payments
- U.S. Individuals – Potential conversion of short-term capital gain and ordinary income into long-term capital gain, as well as deferral



## Derivative Interests in Hedge Funds: Non-U.S. Investors


- Tax stakes: Avoiding common law ownership
- Technique: Total Return Swap over hedge fund value



## Derivative Interests in Hedge Funds: Total Return Swap on Hedge Fund Value

- Dealer pays appreciation in hedge fund's value periodically or at end of term
- Dealer pays distribution-equivalent amount currently
- Customer pays depreciation in hedge fund's value periodically or at end of term
- Customer pays LIBOR plus a credit spread periodically

# Derivative Interests in Hedge Funds: Total Return Swap (cont.)





## Derivative Interests in Hedge Funds: Total Return Swap (cont.)

- US withholding tax treatment of payments of FDAP
  - Foreign investors generally subject to 30% withholding tax on U.S. – source payments of FDAP
  - Income from equity swaps (i.e., NPCs) sourced according to residence of recipient. Reg. § 1.863-7(b)
  - Thus, payments received by a foreign investor under an equity swap will be foreign-source income and not subject to withholding tax. Reg. § 1.1441-4(a)(3)(i)



## Derivative Interests in Hedge Funds: Total Return Swap (cont.)

- Long counterparty should not be treated as tax owner under common law
  - Factors favoring transfer of ownership
    - Benefit from appreciation
    - Bear risk of loss for depreciation
  - Factors against transfer of ownership
    - No right to receive or sell fund shares
    - No right to vote fund shares
    - Have no creditor interest in the hedge fund
    - Short limited duration of ownership in swap



# Derivative Interests in Hedge Funds: U.S. Individuals

- Tax stakes:
  - Must avoid common law ownership – see analysis above
  - Must also avoid Section 1260
    - Section 1260 is intended to prevent taxpayers from entering into derivative contracts for the purpose of converting ordinary income into long-term capital gain and deferring recognition of income until maturity of contract
    - Section 1260 re-characterizes long-term capital gain into ordinary income and imposes interest charge on any deferral



## Derivative Interests in Hedge Funds: Section 1260

- Applies to (i) long-position under equity swaps; (ii) forward to acquire an asset; (iii) same strike collars and (iv) transactions having “substantially same effect”
- Section 1260 does not affect tax ownership for any other purpose of the Code
- Section 1260 does not apply to foreign persons



## Derivative Interests in Hedge Funds: Avoiding Section 1260

- Two basic types of options:
  - Black-Scholes Option – Hard for dealer to hedge, so likely expensive. Very robust from tax perspective
  - Structured Options – More aggressive from tax perspective
    - CPPI option – Underlying consists of a debt or debts plus hedge fund interests
    - Accreting strike price option – Leveraged option where strike price increases at LIBOR plus credit spread



## Derivative Interests in Hedge Funds: Hedge Fund-Linked Debt

- Contingent payment debt rules may apply
  - U.S. holders would be subject to tax under the OID regulations based on the “comparable yield” of the issuer
  - Would be treated as interest income
  - All gains on sale ordinary
- Non-U.S. holders arguably exempt from tax under the portfolio interest rules



# ERISA Implications



# ERISA Implications: Overview

- Private pension plans, IRAs, and Governmental pension plans are likely investors
- Private pension plans are subject to ERISA
  - ERISA imposes strict fiduciary rules on persons who invest “plan assets”
  - ERISA prohibits certain transactions between a plan and parties in interest to a plan (including fiduciaries and service providers)
  - ERISA imposes personal liability on plan fiduciaries for losses; civil penalties and excise taxes apply to prohibited transactions



## ERISA Implications: Overview (cont.)

- IRAs are not subject to ERISA's fiduciary rules, but are subject to prohibited transaction rules under the Internal Revenue Code
- Governmental plans are not subject to ERISA, but are subject to regulation under State law



# ERISA Implications: Plan Asset Rules

- If a plan acquires an equity interest in another entity, the plan's assets include both the equity interest and an undivided interest in each of the entity's underlying assets unless:
  - the investment is a *publicly offered security*
  - the entity is an *operating company*; or
  - equity participation in the entity by benefit plan investors is *not significant*
- There is also a statutory exemption for investments in mutual funds



# ERISA Implications: Significant Investment Test

- Investment by Benefit Plan Investors is not significant if less than 25% of the value of any class of the fund's equity interests is held by benefit plan investors
- Benefit plan investors include only those investors subject to ERISA or the Code prohibited transaction rules
  - Governmental plans are not considered benefit plan investors
- The interest of the investment manager is disregarded in applying the test



# ERISA Implications: Significant Investment Test

- Test is a ratio test determined by the ratio of Benefit Plan Investors to total investments in the fund
- Example: Fund has a single class of equity interests
  - \$15,000 held by ERISA Plans
  - \$5,000 held by IRAs
  - \$20,000 held by the Fund manager (disregarded)
  - \$40,000 by governmental plans
  - \$20,000 held by non tax-exempt investors
  - Investment by BPI is significant  $(\$15,000 + \$5,000)/(\$15,000 + \$5,000 + \$40,000 + \$20,000) = 25\%$



## ERISA Implications: Significant Investment Test

- If a plan asset entity makes an investment in another entity (i.e., an investment fund) only the percentage of the equity interest held by the Benefit Plan Investors is taken into account
- Example: Investment Fund A makes an investment in Fund B. 30% of the equity of Fund A is held by Benefit Plan Investors. Fund A buys 40% of the equity of Fund B. In applying the test to Fund B, only 12% ( $30\% \times 40\%$ ) of Fund A's investment is considered to be investment by Benefit Plan Investors



# ERISA Implications: Publicly-Offered Securities

- A security is deemed to be publicly-offered if it satisfies all three requirements:
  - Part of a class of securities registered under section 12(b) or 12(g) of the '34 Act or part of a public offering under '33 Act registration statement and class of securities is registered under the '34 Act when purchased;
  - *Widely-held* (if it is owned by 100 or more investors that are independent of the issuer and each other); and
  - *Freely-transferable*.
    - Factual question.
    - If the minimum investment is less than \$10,000, presumption is that the security is freely transferable.